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Abstract
Political inventions are so rare that when they do arise they are not recognized–we try to
fit them into traditional classifications, or criticize them for not being something that they were
never intended to be. The European Commission (“Commission”) was a genuinely new political
invention, created to solve a problem. The problem was that the European Community (“EC”)
had to have majority voting. That meant that from time to time minorities would be out-voted.
Majority voting–an old idea, but never before used in an international organization–had to be
made acceptable.
ESSAY
THE COMMISSION: THE KEY TO THE
CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY FOR EUROPE
Dr. John Temple Lang*
"It would be irrational, and contradictory, to suppose that things that
have never yet been done could be done, except by means not yet tried. "'
"The human understanding more easily invents new things than new
words."2
"There is nothing more difficult to handle, more doubtful of success, and
more dangerous to cany through than initiating changes in a State's
constitution. The innovator makes enemies of all those who prospered
under the old order... men are generally incredulous, never really trust-
ing new things unless they have tested them by experience.
INTRODUCTION
Genuinely new political inventions are rare. In fact, it is
hard to think of more than one in the last century. The idea of a
general assembly of all the countries in the world, or of a world
court, had been suggested long before the League of Nations set
them up. The idea of a European Council with weighted voting
and Turkish membership had been suggested by William Penn
in 1693.
In fact, political inventions are so rare that when they do
arise they are not recognized - we try to fit them into tradi-
tional classifications, or criticize them for not being something
that they were never intended to be. The European Commission
("Commission") was a genuinely new political invention, created
to solve a problem. The problem was that the European Com-
munity ("EC") had to have majority voting. That meant that
* Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton, Brussels and London; Professor, Trinity Col-
lege, Dublin; Visiting Senior Research Fellow, Oxford. I am grateful to Eamonn Gal-
lagher for comments on drafts of this Essay.
1. FRANCIS BACON, NOVUM ORGANUM (1620).
2. AL EXIS DE TOCQUEVILL E, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1835).
3. NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE (1514).
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from time to time minorities would be out-voted. Majority vot-
ing - an old idea, but never before used in an international or-
ganization - had to be made acceptable.
I. THE COMMUNITY METHOD
The best way, perhaps the only way, to do this was to discuss
only proposals that had been carefully drawn up by a body
equally independent of all the Member States, whose job would
be to devise every proposal in the best interests of the Commu-
nity as a whole, reconciling conflicting interests as far as possible.
This body would not adopt or decide policy - that would be
done by the Council and the European Parliament. The new
body, in other words, was only a mediator and a think-tank for
developing and proposing new policies. This mediation tech-
nique has come to be called the "Community method."4 It is not
a supranational method - the policy decisions are all made by
representatives of Member States in the Council and the Euro-
pean Parliament. This is the Rome Treaty equivalent of the
"checks and balances" in the United States Constitution.
Once this new body, the Commission, was envisaged, it was
seen that it could be given other tasks. Because it would be
equally independent of all the Member States, it could be
trusted to negotiate treaties on behalf of the EC. It could also
enforce rules already adopted by States, bring States that failed
to fulfil their obligations before the Court of Justice, and make
legally binding decisions in certain areas involving State aid or
State enterprises.
But decision-making complicated the role of the Commis-
sion - or rather, gave it a second, distinct, role. Insofar as the
Commission is a think-tank proposing policies, its proposals go
nowhere unless they are accepted by the Council (and the Par-
4. See JOHN TEMPLE LANG & EAMONN GALLAGHER, THE ROLE OF THE COMMISSION
AND QUALIFIED MAJORITY VOTING (1995) (describing current role of Commission and
advocating that enhanced role is necessary to ensure that future Member States' rights
are respected). See also JOHN TEMPLE LANG, IS THERE A RATIONAL EUROPEAN CONSTITU-
TION Now? (1998) (providing history of origins of Commission and assessing current
method of operation). See alsoJOHN TEMPLE LANG, THE ROLE OF THE COMMISSION AND
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (2000) (discussing role of Commission and European Par-
liament). See also John Temple Lang, The Commission and the European Parliament after
Nice (2001), at http://www.europeaum.org/events/lectures.html (discussing how
events surrounding Treaty of Nice have called into question role and functions of Com-
mission).
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liament, in an increasing number of cases). Insofar as the Com-
mission is taking legally binding decisions, however, based on
already existing rules, it is subject to judicial review, but not to
political approval. It needs to be equally independent of all the
Member States for both tasks, but they are very different - one
is policy-forming, the other is quasi-judicial.
Two tasks may have been understood by commentators -
even superficial or ill-disposed ones. But gradually, the situation
became more complicated. The Commission was given funds to
allocate and administer, and a variety of other executive tasks for
which it had not been designed and for which it was not particu-
larly well-suited. This gave rise to several problems. The first was
that the Commission did not always perform its new additional
executive tasks very well. The second, more subtle and more se-
rious problem was that many people forgot why the Commission
was originally created, and what it was primarily designed to do.
People started to refer to the Commission, quite wrongly, as an
executive, a government, a secretariat, or a civil service. Thus,
upon attempting to, quite wrongly, force the Commission into a
traditional classification, people then criticized it for not having
the characteristics appropriate for that classification. It now
seems that the sui generis "Community method," in which the
Commission is a representative, independent, policy-proposing
think-tank, is becoming better understood and more widely ap-
proved. Yet, it is still controversial in some quarters.
The question now arises whether the Commission should be
changed or adapted in some way, to better fulfill its future role.
Since the Commission is the key institution in the European
Union ("EU") structure, questions about the Commission are
fundamental. The larger and more diverse the EU becomes, the
more necessary it is to have new policies proposed by an inde-
pendent and fully representative mediation body - however
human and fallible - responsible for trying to reconcile all the
interests affected by each new policy.
A. Why is the "Community Method" Still Controversial?
Once the connection between majority voting and policy-
proposals by an independent body is understood, why is it still
controversial, especially in the United Kingdom ("UK")? There
seem to be several reasons:
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* The reasons for it are not understood (Europe has so far no
Federalist Papers, and the Community method has had no
Montesquieu);
* Majority voting, regarded as a loss of sovereignty, is disliked;
* The Commission's decision-making role, in which it has
power to apply already existing rules, is confused with its task
of suggesting new policies for consideration;
" The Commission has considerable influence, and is com-
prised of foreigners;
* Some European politicians, including some British ones,
would still prefer nineteenth century balance-of-power polit-
ics;
" After one strong Commission President, Jacques Delors,
there has been a deterioration in the Commission's reputa-
tion;
* The Murdoch press and television in the UK are influential,
and they are extremely and persistently anti-European;
* A mediator institution like the Commission does not fit into
Montesquieu's classification of legislative, executive, and judi-
cial bodies - the Council and the Commission are hybrids,
and the Parliament has no right of initiative;
* "Brussels," usually associated in the public mind with the
Commission, is blamed for decisions taken by the Council,
and governments are happy to let the Commission take the
blame;
* In a multi-State group, the will of all the peoples can be ex-
pressed only by structures different from those within States.
One advantage of the "Community method" has been
greatly underestimated. Since only proposals made by the Com-
mission can be considered by the Council and the Parliament, it
is impossible for lobbyists to get Members of the European Par-
liament to propose legislation. The "Community method" is a
tremendous constraint on excessive legislation, and a valuable
limitation on the powers of big business and vested interests.
One has only to look at the United States to see how easily lobby-
ists can get Senators and Congressmen, anxious for re-election,
to propose Bills on every conceivable subject. If the power of the
Commission to influence policy is sometimes resented, its value
as a safeguard against pressure groups should also be welcomed.
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B. What Would be the Alternatives to the "Community Method"?
The "Community method" applies only to policy formula-
tion, not to decision-making. For this purpose, there are essen-
tially only four other possibilities:
* Unanimous voting, which does not seem to need safeguards,
given that States in a minority have a veto. But they could be
bullied, especially if they are small States, and unanimity
would often lead to deadlock;
* Common policies only for whichever States happen to agree
easily on the policies in question. But with this, the EU
would hardly be necessary, and it could not be effective since
each policy might involve different States, and each policy
would be devised without enough efforts to make it accept-
able to the other States;
* No safeguards for minorities - majority voting, on the as-
sumption that the EU is so homogenous and so imbued with
solidarity that safeguards are as unnecessary as they would be
for Yorkshire or Devon. But clearly, the EU is not like that,
and it will be even less like that after its enlargement to
twenty-five States;
• An independent body of some kind which would veto any
new policy that did not safeguard minority interests. Such a
body would be obstructive, negative, and unpopular - and
probably ineffective, because minority interests are best pro-
tected by well designed compromises, not by crude vetoes.
So what might a large Member State, like the UK, want to
see if consensus could not be easily found? If there was no medi-
ator institution, or if the mediator was not involved in all the new
policies, a large Member State could envisage two possibilities: it
could act together with the other large States, and disregard the
small States, or it could bully the small States. That seems to
exhaust the alternatives.
C. Intergovernmentalism or the "Community Method"?
As the other possibilities are all clearly unsatisfactory, the
basic choice is between the "Community method" and in-
tergovernmentalism. All of the current controversies revolve
around this basic issue. The choice between the "Community
method" and intergovernmentalism will ultimately determine
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the relative influence of the different Member States. The
"Community method" assures a certain equality between Mem-
ber States, in that they are all "represented" in all the institu-
tions, even if they have different voting rights. Intergovern-
mentalism seems likely to lead to the EU being dominated by
Germany and, to a lesser extent, by France. The key issues in the
choice between the "Community method" and the intergovern-
mental approach relate to the Commission.
1. How many Commissioners?
The first issue is whether the number of Commissioners
should be reduced, so that there would no longer be one Com-
missioner from each Member State at all times. Reducing the
size of the Commission from twenty-five or more to, say, twelve
or fifteen would make it less representative, introduce inequality
between the States with nominees and those without, and lead
States without nominees to question both the Commission's pro-
posals for policy and its legally binding decisions. Commission-
ers do not represent the States that nominated them, but every
State must have confidence in the Commission at all times, and
having a nominee ensures this.
Rotation of Commissioners would not provide equality be-
tween States - a large State with no Commissioner is still in a
strong position; a small State with no Commissioner is not. To
say that a smaller Commission would be stronger is to confuse its
tasks. A smaller Commission would be a more efficient execu-
tive, but a weaker policy-forming and decision-making body.
The proposal, therefore, would sacrifice the more important
tasks that are the Commission's raison d'gtre to the less important,
and less necessary, tasks.5
In its December 2002 document,6 the Commission pro-
5. SeeJohn Temple Lang & Eamonn Gallagher, European Action Centre, What Sort
of European Commission Does the European Union Need?, available at http://wwww.ac-
tioncentreeurope.org.uk/publications/whatsortofcommission.html. See alsoJohn Tem-
ple Lang, How Much Do the Smaller Member States Need the European Commission?, 39 COM-
MON MARKET L. REv. 315 (2002).
6. See Commission Communication, For the European Union: Peace, Freedom, Solidar-
ity, COM (2002) 728 Final (Dec. 2002) (hereinafter For the European Union). The Com-
mission's previous institutional communication was Commission Communication, A
Project for the European Union, COM (2002) 247 Final (May 2002). There is also a draft
treaty, produced on the instructions of Mr. Prodi, referred to as "Penelope." See Euro-
pean Commission, Feasibility Study: Contribution to a Preliminary Draft, Constitution of the
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posed giving the Council and the Parliament "equivalent rights
both for the appointment and for monitoring the action of the
Commission" and declared that "the Commission would be ac-
countable to both the Parliament and the Council." The Com-
mission then said that it "follows" from what it had said that the
size of the Commission should be restricted, as envisaged by the
Nice Treaty. But the conclusion that the Commission should be
reduced in size does not "follow" from anything that had been
said. Second, the Commission failed even to mention the (prob-
ably insoluble) problem left unresolved by the Nice Treaty, of
how to create a "representative" Commission if a substantial
number of Member States have no right to nominate a Commis-
sioner for five years at a time. It is a serious failure of responsi-
bility by the Commission that it has not faced this issue.7 Third,
the Commission says that it "would assert its governmental role."
But the Commission is not a government, and it was never in-
tended to be a government. Moreover, the Commission's pro-
posals would not make it into a government for it is a policy-
proposing think-tank. Its decision-making powers and its execu-
tive responsibilities are much less important than its policy-form-
ing powers. It would be a mistake of the highest magnitude to
sacrifice the Commission's independence and representative
composition essential for its policy-forming role, to the less im-
portant "executive" tasks that it has accepted in recent years.
Furthermore, the Commission is badly equipped to carry them
out.
2. Should the President of the Commission (or Even the
Whole Commission) be Elected (not Merely
Approved) by the Parliament?
This would strengthen the position of the President or the
Commission politically - he would be democratically elected.
The latter would also involve some risks. It would reduce the in-
European Union working Document (Apr. 2002), available at http://europa.eu.int/
ifuturum/documents/offtext/coist05 1202_en.
7. The suggestion that the President of the Commission would choose the other
members of the Commission does not solve this problem, and is open to the objections
that the Commission would be unrepresentative and that the President would have too
much power. An insoluble problem so crucial to the Constitution of the EU should not
be dealt with merely by trusting in an infallible President. See generally For the European
Union, supra n.6.
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dependence of the Commission vis-d-vis the Parliament. Cur-
rently, the independence of the Commission is assured because
it is appointed by one body, the Council, and removed (except
individually for misconduct or incapacity) by another body (the
Parliament). Under this proposal, the body with the power to
elect the President would have power to remove the whole Com-
mission. Because the Parliament had elected the President and
might re-elect him, it would be inclined to give him orders. And
the independence of the Commission is essential if it is to de-
velop genuine common policies or to enforce common rules.
This suggestion would mean that the President would be elected
by some majority of the Parliament, and would be dependent on
a majority of the Parliament for re-election. Candidates would
have to make themselves acceptable to a majority, and would be
likely to disregard the interests of the minority, who would most
likely not vote for them. This would also inevitably lessen the
independence of the Commission vis-d-vis the Parliament. It
certainly could not increase its independence. The President
would be regarded as a political appointee of the political major-
ity (e.g., socialist, centrist, or conservative) in the Parliament,
and would no longer be politically independent or neutral. This
would weaken the Commission, not strengthen it.
It is true that the President might be elected by a two-thirds
or a three-fifths majority of the Parliament, and this would mean
that the main political parties in the Parliament would have to
agree on a candidate. That would make the President less
closely associated to any one political party, but more politically,
subject to the instructions of the majority in Parliament. It is
also true that election by Parliament should end the undesirable
tradition of choosing Commission Presidents from among for-
mer Prime Ministers, which is far too limited a group.
Depending on the powers of the President, there might be
other undesirable effects. Elections would further strengthen
the power of the President over the rest of the Commission -
he already has power to make Commissioners resign, without
cause and without judicial review (but with the assent of the
other Commissioners, apparently by a majority). The extraordi-
nary suggestion has been made that the President would choose
the other Commissioners, which would destroy the representa-
tive and independent nature of the Commission, and lead it to
represent only the political views of the President. If the Presi-
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dent had been elected by the Parliament, he could come under
pressure to dismiss a Commissioner whose policies displeased a
majority in the Parliament. The solidarity and collective respon-
sibility of the Commission would be weakened.' It is easy to see
that a majority (perhaps a temporary, or temporarily enraged
majority) of the Parliament might be found for a resolution call-
ing on the President to dismiss, say, a Competition Commis-
sioner who was regarded as too strict on State aid issues, even if a
majority of the Commission had previously approved all of his
proposals. There is a risk that the election of the Commission
President by the Parliament may be advocated for the wrong rea-
sons:
* To try to strengthen a weak President;
* To increase the powers of the Parliament;
" To discourage the creation of a "President of the Council."
The proposal is an aspect of the rivalry between the two insti-
tutions and the rivalry between the large and the small Mem-
ber States.
Certainly, having the Parliament elect the President would
be undesirable if it led to removal of the Commission's exclusive
right to propose new policies. Apparently, strengthening the
President of the Commission might in fact weaken the Commis-
sion as a whole. The President is a member of the Commission
over whose appointment each Member State has at present a
veto. If unanimity continues to be required, (which is not yet
decided), this means that a State can weaken the Commission by
preventing the appointment of a strong President. The more
powerful the Presidency, the more reluctant the large Member
States will be to give up this veto. States might be particularly
anxious to prevent the emergence of a strong President if being
elected by the Parliament would reinforce his position.
However, if the President of the Commission was selected by
8. The Commission repeats the suggestion that the President should have power
"to oppose any initiatives he judges inopportune," that is, he should have a veto over
any "initiative" of the Commission. This power, which would destroy the equality of
Commissioners, would make it undesirable for the President to be elected by Parlia-
ment, because it would give Parliament another way of interfering with the indepen-
dence of the Commission. It would also give the President power to veto any initiative
to which he was politically opposed. This would also make it harder for any candidate
whose Member State was opposed to further EU initiatives to be elected President. See
getnerally For the European Union, supra n.6
THE COMMISSION
some kind of Electoral College of the national parliaments and
the European Parliament voting together from a list of nomina-
tions by several national governments, these objections would be
reduced, depending on how the Electoral College was com-
posed.
3. Should the Council Have Power to Remove
the Commission?
At present, the independence of the Commission is assured
because it is appointed by one institution and is removable by
another, i.e., the Parliament. If the same institution could re-
move and reappoint,9 the Commission would be essentially
under the control of the Council. The Council could at any
time dismiss the Commission and appoint a Commission more
to its liking. So the idea that this proposal would strengthen the
Commission is simply wrong - it would weaken it. It is naive to
believe that the Commission would be strengthened by being
made subject to the control of its principal institutional rival.
It may be said that the Commission has, wisely or unwisely,
accepted "executive" tasks, so it must be accountable for them.
This sounds reasonable, but is misguided. The independence of
the Commission is essential to the "Community method." The
Commission cannot be independent of the Council for some
purposes but not for others. Independence is essential for the
Commission's policy-proposing and decision-making tasks.
These are much more important than its executive tasks, and the
independence needed for its more important tasks should not
be sacrificed to obtain accountability for its less important ones.
The independence of the Commission makes it necessary that it
should not be subject to "censure" on specific issues, whether
legal decisions or political proposals, by either the Parliament or
9. The Commission proposed, in December 2002, that the Council and Parliament
should have equivalent rights for appointing and monitoring the Commission, and that
the Council should have "the right to censure the Commission's action." This proposal
was not clearly written, and it does not seem well considered. It does not seem to refer
merely to the Parliament's power to remove the whole Commission. Neither the Parlia-
ment nor the Council now have the right to "censure the Commission's action." Parlia-
ment has no power to give the Commission instructions and no right to criticize specific
actions of the Commission. Specific Commission actions are matters for the Commu-
nity courts, not the Parliament or the Council, if they have legal effects. If Parliament
dislikes the Commission's political proposals, they can be rejected without "censure."
2003] 1607
1608 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 26:1598
the Council. If that means giving up the Commission's "execu-
tive" tasks, so be it.
In fact, there is another fundamental objection. An institu-
tion like the Commission should be responsible to one other
body, not two. Control by two other bodies is either superfluous
(if they agree) or a cause of conflict (if they do not). The same
objection applies to the idea of the President of the Commis-
sion, or a European "Minister for Foreign Affairs" being respon-
sible to both the Commission and the Council.'
In short, at least two of the three principal proposals for
altering the rules concerning the Commission are open to ques-
tion. They would all weaken it, not strengthen it. It is therefore
worrying that supporters of the Commission, by a majority, have
seen it fit to support all three proposals. But there is a much
more serious suggestion being made, which would affect the
Commission, although it primarily concerns the Council.
4. Should the Council Have a "President" and who Should a
President be Responsible to?
This is a political proposal, not a legal one. It is not clear
what powers, if any, a Council "President" would have. Essen-
tially, it seems that he would be some kind of a chairperson or a
spokesperson of the EU on foreign policy, acting on the instruc-
tions of the Council, and implementing Council decisions.
What is clear is that a President-spokesperson, whatever precisely
he did, would substantially diminish the role of the Commission-
ers responsible for external relations, and of the Commission as
a whole, which is intended to represent the EU in all interna-
tional trade negotiations.
Even if the present position of High Representative was
abolished and one Commission Vice President for foreign policy
was appointed, having both a Council President and a Commis-
sioner for foreign policy would recreate the difficulties already
caused by having both Mr. Solana and two Commissioners all
representing the EU in external matters. The German view that
10. There is one change that would certainly make sense - the Parliament should
have the same powers as other institutions to start the procedure to remove an individ-
ual member of the Commission for misconduct or incapacity. If Parliament had had
this power in 1999, it would have been able to have any individual Commissioner re-
moved if there were sufficient reasons to do so.
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spokesperson, he will do nothing to develop a common foreign
policy. If he is full time (and not a head of government) and his
job is to develop and execute policies, he would need an inde-
pendent and representative body to help him - exactly what the
Commission already is - unless, of course, he relies merely on
the large Member States. If his institution is not independent
and representative, its proposals will inspire less confidence than
those of the Commission.
But if the proposals are not approved by the Parliament,
they will inspire less popular support too. The economic policy
of the EC may have been left to technocrats; foreign policy will
certainly not be. Those who propose a common foreign policy
for the EU do not seem to have understood this. Under the pre-
sent proposals, the Parliament may discuss foreign policy, but it
can decide only on trade agreements. Foreign policy will not,
and probably cannot, be subject to judicial review. But it cer-
tainly ought to be subject to democratic control. It is hard to
imagine a worse basis for a foreign policy or one more likely to
become unacceptable or easily exploited by adversaries, than two
heads, two institutions, majority voting without safeguards, and
autocracy with inadequate democratic control and without ac-
countability or transparency. Legitimacy concerns the process as
well as the result.
A. So, Should the Scope of the "Community Method" be Widened?
If the "Community method" is accepted, two questions arise
- should it apply to Common Foreign and Security Policy or to
Justice and Home Affairs, the second and third EU "Pillars"?
Foreign policy has so far been subject to unanimity, and the me-
diator role of the Commission is different if every State has a
veto - the mediator can help find compromises, but is not pri-
marily needed to safeguard minorities. It is an honest broker,
not a protector. But with twenty-five Member States, unanimity
will be rare and the scope for a dissident to threaten a veto un-
less it gets a concession on some wholly unrelated issue would
greatly increase. But it is clear on the basis of experience with
the Third Pillar (Justice and Home Affairs) that negotiations are
more efficient and successful when based on a single balanced
proposal made by a representative and independent mediator.
Hidden agendas and secret deals are less likely.
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a President of the Council would increase the intergovernmental
element in the EU is certainly correct. The proposal would
strengthen the Council and diminish the Commission; perhaps
that is one reason why the UK, France, and Spain suggested it.
The proposal for a President of the Council is not an adjust-
ment of the "checks and balances" within the EU. It is the result
of the institutional rivalry between the Council and the Commis-
sion and the contest between inter-governmentalism and the
"Community method." The EU does not need a two-headed ex-
ecutive. The Franco-German proposal has provoked strong criti-
cism. One individual cannot be satisfactorily responsible to two
(or even three) institutions.
A version of this idea, with certain advantages, is that the
President of the Commission would also be the President of the
Council. This would entirely change the relationship between
the two institutions. But it would not strengthen the Commis-
sion because its independence would be weakened. Ajoint Pres-
ident would have to be elected by the Council and the Parlia-
ment, not the Council alone. The UK opposes the idea of one
person being President of both bodies on the grounds that he
would have too much power. But the principal objection to one
person holding both Presidencies is that it would entirely con-
fuse the roles of the two institutions. And it is curious to object
to the two Presidencies being held by one person because it
would give him too much power, but not to object to a common
foreign policy without democratic control, which would give all
the governments too much power.'
II. A COMMON FOREIGN POLICY WITH MAJORITY VOTING
AND WITHOUT DEMOCRATIC CONTROL?
Nobody has suggested that the President of the Council
should be approved by the European Parliament or by national
parliaments. A new and more serious "democratic deficit" would
arise, whatever the exact powers and functions of the President
were. If the Council President, however appointed, is merely a
11. The Danish Prime Minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, has suggested a variation
of this plan under which the Council President would be chosen in rotation from three
groups of the small, medium, and large States. This would certainly make the plan
more acceptable to the smaller States. But it would make the system even more compli-
cated, and it would do nothing to reconcile the Council and the Commission, or the
intergovernmental method with the Community method.
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It is clear, of course, that large Member States think of for-
eign policy and security matters as important to their "sover-
eignty," and that they are unlikely to allow the Commission or
anyone else to influence them. It is also clear that if the Com-
mission were to exercise its mediator task in this area, it would
need additional and differently qualified officials. Let us be
frank about the other difficulties of a common foreign and se-
curity policy:
* There are considerable differences between the reach and
the areas of interest of the Member States in different parts
of the world (France in Africa, Spain in South America, and
Germany in Central Europe);
" There are considerable differences in military strength, and
willingness to use it, among Member States;
• Discussion of a common defense policy is sensitive for coun-
tries that have regarded themselves as neutral (Austria, Fin-
land, Sweden, Ireland);
* Some issues are much more important to some Member
States than to others;
• There is a widespread impression that the UK would prefer
to share a foreign and defence policy with the United States
than with the rest of Europe;
* A consistently applied and comprehensive EU foreign policy
would raise the question of replacing the UK and French
seats in the United Nations ("U.N.") Security Council with
one EU seat;
* There is a fear, especially in the smaller Member States, of
being caught up in something that they would not be able to
opt out of or to control. Ireland is not the only State whose
nightmare is conscription into a foreign army.
These are all reasons why a common foreign and security
policy is difficult. But they are not reasons why the Commission
cannot perform its mediator role. Nor are they reasons why the
Parliament should be kept out. The objection is simple - the
large Member States do not want to share power with the Com-
mission or the Parliament. This is not democracy.
There is another difficulty. It is not clear how many of the
EU Member States today really have a considered and compre-
hensive foreign policy that they could hope to carry out effec-
tively on their own. Apart from the astonishingly frank and wise
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Christian Democratic Union ("CDU")/ Christian Social Union
("CSU") policy statement in 1994 on Germany's interest in a
prosperous and stable Central Europe (the conclusion of which
was precisely that Germany could not ensure this on its own), it is
not easy to think of an up-to-date, comprehensive and realistic
foreign policy statement by any EU government in recent years.
Before refusing to contemplate majority voting on foreign policy
issues on the basis of the "Community method," most EU Mem-
ber States would be wise to consider how far such foreign policy
notions are based on nostalgia, self-deception, dislike of "for-
eigners," or on sacred cows (not clearly thought out), such as
"sovereignty" or "neutrality," or on wholly imaginary and irra-
tional fears of "superstates," or on merely saying "no." Repeat-
ing that Europe must be based on Nation States does not
amount to a policy, even on European affairs, since that phrase
is neither operational, constructive, nor precisely correct.
One thing seems clear - a common foreign and security
policy for an EU of twenty-five or more States needs majority
voting. Majority voting, if it is to be acceptable in the long run,
needs the Community method. Majority voting on an unbal-
anced proposal pushed through by the large Member States
would not lead to popular acceptance. The situation would be
still worse if the foreign policy, however formulated, was not sub-
ject to democratic control either. It is clear that two entirely dif-
ferent ways of managing policy, with entirely different powers
and procedures, would be thoroughly undesirable in an already
loose group of States.
In the fields of Justice and Home Affairs (immigration, or-
ganized crime, terrorism, and so on), the common interests of
Member States are clear, and many of the issues are technical.
The basic difficulty is how to reconcile human rights with effec-
tive enforcement and how to ensure that due process is provided
by frustrated policemen. These issues are difficult, but they do
not obviously or necessarily cause conflict between large and
small States, or between the EU institutions. So the Community
method should be used.
B. The European Parliament
The "Community method" is also under pressure as a result
of the Parliament's efforts to increase its powers in two ways: the
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right to initiate policy proposals and the co-decision procedure.
The Commission's exclusive right to initiate EU policies, which
will be even more necessary to safeguard the interests of minori-
ties in a Union of twenty-five States, means that the Parliament
cannot initiate them. Members of the Parliament who do not
seem to understand the reason for this limitation have com-
plained about it. But it does not seem possible to give the Parlia-
ment power to initiate policy without abandoning the safeguard
for minorities (quite apart from the flood of lobbyists' proposals
which would result). It should be enough that the Parliament
can call on the Commission to make proposals.
The co-decision procedure has created a less clear-cut prob-
lem. It arises essentially because the Council's and the Parlia-
ment's texts need reconciliation, and majorities in both bodies
reach agreement on a text, which the Commission does not con-
sider to adequately protect the minority interests involved. In
practice, the Commission produces compromise texts in accor-
dance with its mediator role. If these are ultimately accepted, no
problem arises. Conciliation is confined to reconciling positions
taken by the Parliament and the Council, so the Commission
could act at an earlier stage to protect minority interests, if nec-
essary. In theory, the Commission could withdraw its proposal
and stop the proceedings. However, the interplay between the
three institutions tends to give rise to something approaching
instructions to the Commission on the timing and the content of
future proposals that, if taken literally, would be inconsistent
with the independence to which the Parliament pays lip service,
but which it sometimes seems not to understand. Some of this is
procedural technicality, but the safeguards for minority interests
are not. All three institutions need to be acutely aware of the
need to protect minority interests as far as possible. They also
need to be aware of the need to avoid the time-wasting processes
of reconciling similar texts, which is such a regrettable feature of
the U.S. Congress.
C. Where are We Going?
Are we therefore going to have two parallel Unions, one in-
tergovernmental, the other based on the "Community method,"
as Joschka Fischer feared?
There would obviously be risks in having a foreign policy
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devised and conducted by a majority of the Council without the
safeguard of a mediator, when the EU's economic policies are
subject to a different and democratically controlled institution
producing more carefully designed policies. The two sets of pol-
icies might conflict, there would be different priorities, there
would be demarcation problems, and much time would have to
be spent on coordination. Having two Presidents, elected by dif-
ferent institutions, is certain to lead to confusion, if not to con-
flict.'2 The more effective and powerful the Council President
becomes, the greater the risk of conflict. Each of the two cur-
rent proposals for elected Presidents are open to objection on
institutional grounds. The combination is open to the further
objection that it would institutionalize rivalry, and add another
difficulty to the problems of having one foreign policy for
twenty-five States. The reality is that the inter-governmental con-
ception of Europe (leading to the idea of a President of the
Council) is not compatible with the Community method, which
has led, wisely or otherwise, to the idea of the Parliament elect-
ing the President of the Commission. The Franco-German pro-
posal is not a compromise. It is a mixture of incompatibles,
which would make the EU more complex instead of simpler. It
does nothing to resolve the incompatibility between the inter-
governmental and the Community approaches.
But the even more fundamental objection to strengthening
the Union's foreign policy without using the "Community
method" is that policies developed by and between governments
would not be subject to effective democratic control. An EU
with an effective foreign policy would be profoundly undemo-
cratic, unless the Community method is used. The large Mem-
ber States are not immune to hypocrisy and they have an obvious
interest in promoting a more inter-governmental EU.
Maybe we must accept that a lasting or satisfactory docu-
ment will not emerge from the European Convention, the inter-
12. Andrew Duff MEP has called the Franco-German proposal "a potentially disas-
trous recipe for internal confusion and external cacophony." Peter Sutherland has said
that it would undermine Europe's greatest achievement - "the delicate balance be-
tween the interests of sovereign States and the overall European interest." See Peter
Sutherland, A second EU jrresident would be divisive, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2003, at 13. The
recent proposals for a Council President are not the first time that France, Germany,
and the UK have tried to impose an intergovernmental regime over the Community.
See generally GARRET FrrzuRALD, REFL ECTIONS ON THE IRISH STATE 166-69 (2003).
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governmental conference, and afterwards. The Convention is
probably trying to move too fast - perhaps a constitution for an
entire continent cannot be completed in six months. Certainly,
a Union with two Presidents built on two mutually inconsistent
principles of intergovernmentalism and the Community method
would be neither democratic nor lasting. However, that may be
all we can get at this time. If so, we will have to recognize that
the 1787 Convention in Philadelphia ("Philadelphia Conven-
tion"), which drafted the U.S. Constitution, did a better job.
The Philadelphia Convention would never have suggested two
executives for foreign policy, with the more influential one not
subject to checks and balances or to democratic control.'"
Ill. THE ADVANTAGES OF THE CONVENTION IN
PHILADELPHIA IN 1787
Those lawyers who wrote the EC Treaties set out to do some-
thing that nobody had done before - to write a treaty that
would turn into a constitution. This was more difficult than the
task of the Philadelphia Convention. The members of the Phila-
delphia Convention realized, almost at once, that they were writ-
ing a new constitution. They had several other advantages, in
comparison with the present European Convention:
" First, the Constitutional Convention consisted entirely of a
relatively homogenous group (all white European male land-
owners, no Black or Native American peoples). The mem-
bers were all Christians or Deists or from one of those tradi-
tions, they had all read Montesquieu and Blackstone, and
shared the same common law tradition. In addition, they all
spoke the same language, had all recently succeeded in a war
of independence, and were not prejudiced against one an-
other by nationality, race, or class;
* Second, the members were starting with a virtually blank
page. They were unencumbered by governments or institu-
tions with vested interests or rivalries, or by States accus-
tomed to having their own foreign policies;
* Third, unlike Schengen and Euroland, they did not have to
13. See Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 75, in THE FEDERALIST 475-80 (B.F.
Wright ed., 1961) (stating that under U.S. Constitution, President has power to make
treaties with advice and consent of Senate, provided that two-thirds of the Senators who
are present concur).
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deal with groups of States, which had already made arrange-
ments of their own;
* Fourth, they knew that they were in a time of great change,
and on the threshold of a new period of history;
" Fifth, none of the members needed to hold referenda on the
new constitution in their States (nine of the new Member
States in Europe and several of the present Member States
will have referenda on accession or on the new constitutional
treaty);
" Sixth, there was no substantial body of opinion at the Phila-
delphia Convention that was opposed to the whole exercise
and anxious to reverse what had already been done;
* Seventh, the Philadelphia Convention had George Washing-
ton.
Above all, the thirteen states were relatively similar in size,
population, and income per capita, as population was calculated
in those days (none were relatively as large as Germany). This
fact made their job much easier. The aftermath of the Philadel-
phia Convention also obtained one advantage which the Europe-
ans have not yet created - the Federalist Papers thoroughly ex-
plained the reasons for each provision in the new U.S. Constitu-
tion with surprising objectivity.
The European Convention, however, has one important ad-
vantage. It has more than forty years of experience with the
"Community method," a tried and proven technique for recon-
ciling differences and developing policy 5 and the most success-
ful mechanism for conflict prevention in the history of the
world. However, this is not an undiluted advantage. It is not
clearly understood, even by key people, and is not defended by
14. Virginia was about fifteen times as populous as Delaware. Germany, with some
eighty million inhabitants, has about 240 times the population of Luxembourg or
Malta. See The Member States of the European Union-Goany, available at http://eu-
ropa.eu.int/abc/eimembers/gernmay/incexen.htm (stating that Luxembourg's
population is 429,200 people). See also Department of Information - Malta, available at
http://www.foreign.gov.mt/embfiles/defauIlt.htm (stating that Malta's population is ap-
proximately 352,835 people). Of the twenty-five EU States, six States with over forty
million inhabitants will represent 74% of the EU population; eleven States with less
than five million will represent only 7%; and eight other States (each with eight to
sixteen million inhabitants) will represent 19%.
15. See J.T. FLEXNER, WASHINGTON: TiHE INDISI'ENSABL MAN 208 (1969) (stating:
"the [Constitutional] Convention was trying to establish a government altogether new
under the sun, there were no precedents to violate - but also none to steer by.").
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governments who are looking for someone to blame for unpopu-
lar policies. Additionally, there is institutional rivalry between
the Council and the Commission.
In spite of all the difficulties, however, this is a historic time.
Nobody has ever written a constitution for a continent before.
The last time anyone tried to write a constitution for England
was under Cromwell's Instrument of Government in 1653.
CONCLUSION
In this Essay I have essentially argued that there is no satis-
factory alternative to the "Community method" based on an in-
dependent and fully representative Commission. That method
is sound, and should not be substantially altered. It certainly
should not be altered by the ill-considered mixing of different
concepts, or by institutionalising the struggle between them.
The existing treaty provisions are well thought out, but unfortu-
nately, the reasons for them are not well understood. I have also
suggested that recent proposals about the Commission's compo-
sition and powers are badly drafted, ill considered, and if
adopted, would seriously damage the Commission itself. Even
supporters of the Commission do not seem to understand its
raison d'tre, and have poor judgment when they try to assess the
consequences of these proposals.
Unfortunately, the Commission seems likely to be weakened
just as the EU is being enlarged to receive ten new Member
States. This is precisely the time at which the Commission needs
to be strengthened the most. This enlargement is much more
difficult than any previous enlargement.
The UK is unlikely to become the third member of a trium-
virate with France and Germany, dominating Europe on an in-
tergovernmental basis. Recent events concerning Iraq have
pushed that prospect into a very distant future indeed, if it ever
had any substance at all.'" If that were right, the UK would be
16. There are a number of reasons why it was never likely that the UK could obtain
influence equal to that of France or Germany. The UK has always felt itself to be closer
to the United States than to Europe. Instinctively, the UK has always been a reluctant
participant in the EC and the EU. It has consistently discouraged further integration,
but without ever having an alternative policy, either for itself or for Europe as a whole.
The UK's policy on Europe for the last forty years has been nothing more constructive
than a wish not to be left out. It has never been clear whether the UK approves or
disapproves of the European Parliament. It has neither joined Schengen nor adopted
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wise to join with the smaller Member States in extending the
Community method. This method protects minorities, and from
time to time in a Union of twenty-five States, the UK will be in a
minority. Certainly, a new treaty based on the Community
method would be more lasting than what is now being sug-
gested.
the Euro. In the past, it got away with this reluctance because it was making an impor-
tant military contribution to NATO by keeping an army in Germany. But this is no
longer necessary, or indeed relevant. The principal opposition party sounds, at least,
opposed to the EU. The Murdoch press, which is very vocal and which certainly seems
influential, is violently opposed to the UK's involvement in Europe. Until at least some
of these things change, the UK cannot expect to be as influential as France, let alone
Germany, in an intergovernmental system in Europe. And if the UK got into the driv-
ing seat and then began to put on the brakes, it would lose whatever influence it had
obtained. The French and Germans meet regularly; they apparently never invite the
UK to join them. But they have met regularly with the Poles for some years. The draft
constitutional treaty proposed semi-officially on behalf of the UK Government is a cau-
tiotis document. See Alan Dashwood, et al., Draft Constitutional Treaty of the European
Union and Related Documents, 28 EUR. L. REv. 3 (2003).
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